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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Directorate of Intelligence  
8 November 1965

## INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Atlantic Nuclear DefenseSummary

The following paragraphs review the development so far of the discussion on nuclear sharing in the Alliance, the major considerations which have entered into the positions taken by the principals, and the variables which seem likely to determine the course of the dialogue in the immediate future. The frequently intensive discussions of the past six years have not produced anything near a consensus on what additional steps are needed beyond the various consultative arrangements already in place. The basic concepts of the Multilateral Force (MLF) have never been endorsed by a clear majority of the NATO members, nor have many of its key features ever been decided. The Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF) likewise has not received majority support, and there are wide differences between Britain and West Germany over the composition of its forces. The lack of agreement on both projects seems generally attributable to the shifts in the balance of European power each would involve, and more particularly, to the conflicting basic interests both within and among the prospective member countries. Notable among these considerations are the still widespread distrust of Germany, the desire to extend the East-West detente, and the reluctance of most European countries to break irretrievably with France. Little prospect is seen for any early bridging of these differences, and even a strong US commitment to any particular solution to the nuclear problem would not necessarily obtain its acceptance. Furthermore, no strong lead can be expected from either London or Bonn, and a clear indication of a Soviet intention to conclude a non-proliferation treaty would greatly increase the reluctance to sacrifice this for the sake of a collective nuclear arrangement in NATO. Although

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there is strong opposition to De Gaulle's specific positions on Alliance problems, his capabilities for manipulating the present situation are still considerable. Finally, the outcome of the Common Market crisis may well determine what it will be possible to do in NATO. In conclusion, the McNamara proposals present at least a non-controversial interim course of action pending the outcome of the confrontation with France in both the EEC and NATO. Although sooner or later Germany's inequality in the Alliance will have to be redressed, this seems a less pressing question at the moment than it has sometimes been portrayed, and the present German government could probably absorb another postponement of collective nuclear arrangements.

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### Introduction

1. In considering the practicability of any early solution to the problem of nuclear sharing which has been troubling the Alliance for the past half-dozen years, the point to which the question has now evolved should be borne in mind. During that period, several measures of considerable importance have, of course, been implemented; two others--the Multilateral Force (MLF) and the Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF)--have been given more or less exhaustive consideration; and the most recent one--Secretary McNamara's suggestion for a select nuclear committee or special committee of defense ministers--has been tabled, but has yet to be elaborated.

2. The arrangements which have been put into effect, such as the guidelines on the use of nuclear weapons adopted in Athens in 1962 and the steps taken at Ottawa in 1963 to assign certain nuclear forces to SACEUR and to improve nuclear consultation, have been accepted generally in NATO as an earnest of US good intentions. Among those members--and there are several--who are basically satisfied with NATO's nuclear arrangements, these additional measures have contributed to that satisfaction. No member of the Alliance regards these measures as having redressed in any significant way the preponderant US position, however, and for those to whom this is a source of dissatisfaction, their desire for change is unrequited.

3. The McNamara proposals are in this--the pre-MLF lineage--and as such they have likewise been accepted as further evidence of American good will, and perhaps, as a promise to pursue this line of development to some more significant end. Among those Allies favoring this approach, however, the reaction will likely remain one of open-minded interest until it becomes clear what precisely the special committee will be or do, and even more important, to what extent the US considers the committee an "answer" to the nuclear problem.

4. That the MLF and the ANF have therefore been the main focus of discussion on increased nuclear sharing signifies little as to their acceptance. They

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are the only proposals which have been elaborated in any detail, and they have been generally recognized as involving--for better or worse--a basic departure from the nuclear sharing arrangements which have been accepted so far. At no point has a clear majority of the NATO countries endorsed the concepts underlying either project or indicated a willingness to participate in them. Moreover, despite lengthy consideration by the interested members, agreement is still lacking on key aspects of both projects, and were either one or the other to become the "chosen" vehicle, it is still not certain that these outstanding differences would be easily or quickly resolved.

An MLF

5. It is not therefore possible to speak of attitudes towards the MLF in the same sense that it was possible to define positions, for example, towards the European Defense Community (EDC). The eight-nation Paris Working Group (PWG) which considered the MLF from October 1963 to about May 1965, did agree to base its studies on the US proposal for a 25-ship surface fleet with 200 Polaris missiles, in which there would be mixed-manning, collective ownership, and multilateral control. Moreover, by May, "working language" had been approved by the PWG for some seven of the 15 items which were considered essential elements to the establishment of the force. However, this approval was only provisional, and in some cases was very tenuous. For example, the British "approved" the surface fleet as the force vehicle, but they successfully insisted in mid-1964 that the PWG also consider other weapons systems--an idea which they subsequently included in their ANF proposal.

6. Among the other eight essential items on which even provisional agreements remain outstanding are the critical ones of cost-sharing, control arrangements, and charter review. The cost question is important per se, but it is also important because of its relationship to control rights.



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though there is general agreement that the US should retain a veto, no agreement has been reached on how the European members should exercise "their" veto--e.g., individually, or collectively, or by unanimous or

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majority vote. The charter review problem centers on whether the "European option" should be retained--i.e., the possibility of a US withdrawal and the delegation of full control to a potential European union. While the Italians and Germans favor this, the British remain flatly opposed.

#### The ANF

7. These disagreements have--if anything--widened, and others have been added to them since the US agreed last December to Allied consideration of the possibility of melding the MLF concept with the ANF proposals Prime Minister Wilson broached at that time. As the US envisaged it, the meld would consist of Polaris submarines and elements of the V-bomber force to be contributed by the UK, a Polaris surface fleet of substantially the same character if not the size of the proposed MLF fleet, and such strategic nuclear forces as the US or France might be prepared to subscribe. The US further considered that the UK should make a substantial manpower contribution to the mixed-manned surface force and eventually mix-man its submarines if studies showed this to be feasible. The ANF forces would be assigned to SACEUR, the US would retain a veto, voting arrangements on the European side would be determined by the Europeans, the "European option" clause would be retained, and the ANF treaty would be accompanied by non-dissemination undertakings.

8. It cannot be said that the PWG--reduced to six by Turkey's resignation and the provisional withdrawal of Belgium--has in the past year examined these proposals under any pressure to reach an agreement. It can be said, however, that its deliberations and the bilateral contacts among the principal parties have left agreement, to say the least, on a distant horizon. As in the case of the MLF, it is not agreed how many of the European members should have a veto, or contrariwise, whether there should be a collective European veto and how it should be exercised. Although the UK last spring indicated it would accept the "European option" in the language proposed by the US (which would seem in fact to make the evolution towards a European-controlled force rather difficult), its subsequent performance in connection with the draft non-proliferation treaty--for which London was willing to

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rule out a European force--has cast considerable doubt on its earlier concession. Similarly, while it appeared last May that the UK had retreated from its earlier opposition to the assignment of the ANF forces to SACEUR, neither its present views nor the acceptability of them to the others are certain.

9. In any case, on the critical question of the composition of the ANF forces--and all the ramifications this has for costs, cost-sharing, and relative influence in the control of the ANF--no meeting of the minds has been reached. The mixed-manned surface component to be created to give the non-nuclears their real sense of participation has, of course, been precisely that part which nuclear Britain has sought to minimize. Bonn, on the other hand, has accepted, at best reluctantly, the inclusion of Britain's V-bombers in the ANF, and the Italians as well as the Germans have opposed the addition of US Polaris subs to the ANF because of what this would do to their relative percentages vis-a-vis the two nuclear participating powers. The Germans and the Italians have likewise pressed--so far unsuccessfully--for ultimate mixed-manning of the UK Polaris submarines and at least token mixed-manning from the outset. For their part, the British have continued to reiterate their proposals for the inclusion of certain US-based ICBMs as part of the ANF.

#### Other Proposals

10. In short, it is not now clear what the dimensions of an MLF or an ANF would be. They would be delineated only in the course of resumed negotiations, and their acceptability would naturally depend on what form they took. Moreover, we are apparently already at the point of dealing with variations. For example, Assistant Secretary Leddy after his talks last month in The Hague with the chiefs of mission recommended that the US be prepared to accept "some form of collective weapons system"--preferably "some variant of the ANF with the promise of mixed-manning at a future date when the security problem has been overcome." No new weapons would be created now, participating Continental countries would in effect be taking over a portion of the UK defense budget, and the German interest in mixed-manning could be met in part by permitting reversion of payments in the event mixed-manning were not

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achieved. In Leddy's opinion, provided there is firm US support, "there is a chance that both Germany and the UK would accept (such an arrangement) despite German desires for immediate mixed-manning and tendencies in the UK to sacrifice the ANF for non-proliferation."

11. Among the other approaches to nuclear sharing which have been advanced, the special committee--as has been noted above--is still an unknown quantity to the other NATO members, but some of their initial reactions may be worth noting. For one thing, the urge to participate which made it impossible to keep the committee selective reflected a mixture of genuine interest, idle curiosity, and petty rivalries and cannot necessarily be considered evidence of agreement as to what the committee should do, let alone acceptance of this as the best approach to the nuclear problem. There has on the other hand been a certain note of equivocation in the French attitude toward the special committee--an initial noncommittal period, followed by notification of a decision not to participate, followed by a campaign against Brosio's proposed chairmanship, followed most recently by an indication of French willingness to participate in the initial meeting of the defense ministers provided this meeting did not precede the December ministerial. While it may be that France would find the special committee less objectionable than the MLF/ANF approach and may initially even have seen in it a reflection of De Gaulle's directorate idea, there is no reason why, when De Gaulle is rejecting the structure of NATO, he would wish to see it strengthened through such a special committee. Finally, interest in the special committee reflects the belief of some that it is an alternative to the MLF/ANF and a welcome "way out," but reservations as well that it will prove to be an adequate substitute in the long run.

12. Of the other proposals for nuclear sharing which have surfaced, none has advanced beyond the idea stage and many have been no more than notions. The idea of a European nuclear community patterned after the EDC has been broached, but no one has determined how France could be persuaded to join it, how the German role could be made palatable, or how the control mechanism would work. In both France and Britain from time to time there has been talk of a merger of the respective national deterrents as the basis of a "European" deterrent, but no specific suggestions as to

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form, membership, and institutions. De Gaulle has offered to assume the role of protector of European security with the force de dissuasion as an assured deterrent, and has hinted at the possibility of an integrated force in some remote, future time when there is a common European political authority. All of these ideas have had scattered adherents in West Germany. Moreover, in Britain, elements of the Labor Party have lately begun to suggest that London seek for its part to "buy" some "voice" in the control of the US deterrent in return for relinquishing its own.

### The Illusive Consensus

13. From the foregoing it is fair to say, it is believed, that in the past six years or more of discussion the Alliance has never come close to a consensus on what additional nuclear sharing measures were required, over and above the two-key, bilateral arrangements the US has had with individual members, or, the Athens-Ottawa type procedures. This disagreement has persisted not because of any unusual lack of ideas or formulas, and certainly not because of any lack of leadership on the part of the US. Rather, we believe that the review of the individual country positions which follows will strongly suggest that no real agreement has been reached because on the one hand there is a very considerable opinion which holds there is no pressing need to change the existing arrangements, and because on the other hand, when those who feel otherwise have sought to effect a change, they have found the resulting conflict of national interests an insuperable obstacle--most particularly, because such a change would involve, or seem to involve, an unacceptable shift in the balance of European power.

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[REDACTED] Other elements are London's genuine desire to contribute to an East-West detente; the unresolved question of Britain's role in Europe--which De Gaulle's veto of its application for EEC membership only aggravated; the UK's declining but still respectable overseas military and political commitments; and its sensitivity to the importance of modern military technology to Britain's future as an advanced, industrialized society.

15. In the light of these considerations, it is perfectly understandable that Britain's bias has been in the direction of maintaining its privileged position within the Alliance. Prime Minister Wilson's campaign on a platform of abandoning the pretense of nuclear independence undoubtedly reflected a mixture of realistic assessment of Britain's capabilities, sincere belief that he might be the man to strike a disarmament bargain with the Soviets, and the pacifism which is part of Labor's heritage. Moreover, he saw the MLF's taking Britain in directions which many British did not wish to go--adding unnecessarily to the West's nuclear capabilities and encouraging the USSR to reciprocate, enhancing the German role, taking men and money needed for conventional forces, and withal, offering the Europeans a sharp Yankee bargain--i.e., the tab for a force which would remain under US control.

16. Once in office, of course, Wilson was not only subjected to the pressures of the British military establishment, but also rediscovered the political significance of the national deterrent. The ANF proposals were designed both to reconcile campaign pledges with these "realities" and to put on the table a more acceptable alternative to the MLF. As the Labor government saw it, the ANF has or had all the advantages of being based primarily on existing nuclear forces; of therefore not costing very much, clearly not involving proliferation, or greatly enhancing German influence; of providing a "home" for Britain's deterrent forces while London retained authority over at least a portion of them for overseas use until such a time as the Alliance might underwrite its members' overseas commitments. London also hoped for financial assistance with the British POLARIS program, and may even have thought that the ANF would facilitate European, or at least British, acquisition of a "share" in

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the control of the US strategic forces.

17. In the year since the ANF proposals were tendered, significant new elements in British thinking on the nuclear question have not emerged. If anything, the previously existing elements have become more pronounced. For example, in his recent talks with Ambassador Cleveland, Secretary Healey scoffed at the idea of Britain really "giving up" its deterrent, re-emphasized Britain's non-European commitments, and seemed further to de-emphasize the multilateral component of the ANF. Moreover, while it is probable that the Wilson government would still support an ANF--provided it were organized according to British concepts, recent British statements as well as its performance in connection with current difficulties over the draft non-proliferation treaty strongly suggest that in the order of British priorities, disarmament clearly comes first. Finally, given what is known of the special committee proposal and of basic British positions, it must be assumed that London would see much to be preferred in this approach as against an ANF.

18. In the case of West Germany, it is easier to indicate the main elements which enter into German thinking on the nuclear question than to assign to them their appropriate weights, or, to separate the appearance from the reality. At the present time, all responsible German leaders believe that legal, political, and moral considerations rule out for the foreseeable future either German manufacture of nuclear weapons or the acquisition of a nuclear complement exclusively under German control. On the other hand, many--though not all--German leaders have come to regard it as either necessary or desirable that West Germany be given a larger role in the nuclear defense of Western Europe through its participation in some new nuclear sharing scheme within the Alliance.

19. In addition to these more or less basic considerations, important elements in German attitudes on nuclear sharing are: the belief of some that an increment of missiles in the control of which Bonn participates is essential to German security, specifically because of the Soviet nuclears targeted on West Germany; the belief of others that nuclear sharing with US participation is important primarily as a further assurance of continued US involvement in the defense of Europe; the belief of still others that nuclear

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
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sharing is a part of the German rehabilitation process and an aspect of Germany's return to a role in the West commensurate with its power; a general awareness of the US role in Germany's rehabilitation and a tendency therefore to be "agreeable" to US wishes; fear that, given De Gaulle's attitude, a more far-reaching German participation in a nuclear scheme can be accomplished only at the expense of a rupture with France; and finally, cognizance that such participation may have unknown implications for German reunification.

20. It is doubtful that even within the intelligence community--let alone in the Alliance--it would be possible to reach a consensus on the relative importance of these various considerations. Suffice it to say that the evidence would not bear out the contention that Bonn is "red hot" on the nuclear issue; those Germans who wish to move towards some further extension of nuclear sharing within the Alliance do so for a variety of reasons; and before the Germans opt for any particular solution to this problem, they will have to give careful consideration to their other vital national interests which are also at stake. It is difficult to believe that German military leaders in fact consider the country's security in danger at the present time or that Bonn's political leaders believe, given the existence of NATO, the US commitment, and the military forces in Germany, an integrated nuclear force is also necessary to preserve the US security guarantee. Moreover, at least some validity must be credited to the frequent British and French assertion that discussion itself has contributed to creation of the nuclear issue.

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Last fall, the Chancellor

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publicly hinted that the US and Germany should proceed bilaterally with the project. Subsequently, when De Gaulle was thundering against it and shaking the Common Market over the grain price issue, Erhard was willing to make it clear to the French president that the MLF was not a matter for urgent decision.

22. With respect to the ANF, Bonn was cool from the beginning, and as has been indicated above, differences with London over such key issues as mixed-manning, voting procedures, and respective shares in the force have not been reconciled. When the special committee was first proposed, the Germans generally welcomed it as at least another move towards shared participation in nuclear planning. Since they saw it as a forum for increased German influence on Alliance nuclear strategy, they would have preferred a more select group than the one now emerging. Moreover, along with their general endorsement has been the suspicion that the committee is the first step in a US retreat from an integrated nuclear force.

23. At the moment, Von Hassel still strongly supports the original MLF concept, and both Schroeder and Erhard have publicly taken the position that German participation in something like it is essential. It is doubtful, however, that Erhard has any firmly formulated opinions on the matter as yet, and he is relying on such advisers as Kurt Birrenbach to outline possible courses of action. Insofar as his views are known, Birrenbach believes that only German participation in a co-owned nuclear weapons system can give Germany equality with France and Britain--whether existing or new weapons would be the basis of the system is not clear. Birrenbach also accepts continuation of a US veto, but he would have the European decision taken by majority vote. On many of these questions it is obvious the Germans are awaiting the US lead, and there is no indication that Bonn has reached any new determination on how much of a risk it is prepared to run with the French.

24. In its approach to the nuclear question, Italy has been guided by its genuine attachment to the Atlantic concept and European unity; its usual determination to be treated an equal by its European peers;

a more general interest in the continuation of the East-West dialogue; and the exigencies of its often-shaky coalition. The Rome government initially endorsed the

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general concept of the MLF because it saw it as a way to "higher and tighter" forms of political partnership between the US and Europe while assuring Italy some voice in the formulation of Alliance strategy and averting the risk of German acquisition of nuclear arms. This endorsement was renewed by the center-left coalition formed in mid-1964 although there were strong reservations on the part of the Socialists and others [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] and that, in the event of an MLF's including only Germany, Italy, and the US, Italy might be a very junior partner. Opinion in Rome has also seen the MLF as the preferable alternative to a French-dominated European force in which Germany might otherwise decide to participate.

25. In the MLF and ANF discussions, the Italians have made no very original contributions, although they inspired and have since strongly supported the idea of a European clause. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] they have actively sought Britain's participation, and the advent of the Labor government eased the way for Socialist support. Otherwise, they have concentrated on ensuring no discrimination against the non-nuclear powers, advocating an executive "restricted committee" limited to the "main participants," favoring a double US-European veto system, and in most respects, sharing the German reservations regarding the UK views on the composition of the ANF. Italy has welcomed the special committee idea, and some Italian officials seem to hope this may become the focus of nuclear sharing arrangements which would satisfy the Italian desire for joint planning and consultation while avoiding the costs of and postponing the difficult political decisions involved in actually participating in a multilateral force. Although the government considers an MLF consistent with the attainment of a non-proliferation agreement, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] recently acknowledged that Fanfani's proposal for unilateral non-acquisition declarations makes it more difficult to return to discussions of collective nuclear arrangements.

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26. The Benelux countries would have preferred US retention of a monopoly on nuclear weapons in NATO, and none of them chafes under the nuclear arrangements which now prevail. Public opinion has been

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generally cool toward the MLF/ANF proposals and official opinion divided, though neither would necessarily preclude eventual participation. In both Belgium and the Netherlands, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] On the other hand, both countries are devoted Atlanticists which accept the necessity of Alliance integration, and were it deemed necessary to apply this to nuclear weapons, would clearly prefer this to either proliferation or a European system subject either to French or German domination.

27. In Belgium, attitudes have to some extent been contradictory because of Brussels' strong support for an integrated Europe on the one hand, and on the other, the view of many Belgian leaders that no steps be taken which might alienate or isolate France. The latter consideration is uppermost in the minds of leaders like Foreign Minister Spaak, who recognizes the need to grant West Germany a voice in nuclear affairs, but feels this should not be done at the risk of bringing about a break with France. Spaak and a few other Belgian leaders have supported the MLF concept despite the skepticism of influential opinion molders that it would give Europe truly effective control over nuclear weapons, the opposition of military leaders on budgetary grounds, and widespread public indifference. Brussels has been less interested in the ANF, probably assuming that because of Paris' opposition and Bonn's reservations, the proposal is a non-starter. The Belgians, on the other hand, have shown considerable interest in the Select Committee, with Spaak himself indicating that he felt the lack of precision in its terms of reference had particular merit.

28. In contrast to the Belgian attitude, which has tended to be more responsive to French views on the Alliance, the Netherlands' position has been influenced more by its British leanings. Foreign Minister Luns and officials in The Hague remained non-committal on the MLF, partly for budgetary reasons, but also maintaining that it did not meet the problem of providing Europe with an effective voice in nuclear affairs and might give the Germans a disproportionate influence. The Dutch, however, took a considerably

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more sympathetic attitude toward the proposed ANF. Although The Hague has reserved judgment on the Select Committee until its functions are more clearly defined, it has indicated it envisaged the committee as a temporary ad hoc body limited to studying such proposals as the MLF and ANF, and making it clear the Dutch would regard anything resembling a nuclear directorate as "obnoxious" because it would create an exclusive, inner-group within the Alliance.

29. The remaining NATO members have been on the periphery of the nuclear debate. Although both Greece and Turkey initially joined the PWG with enthusiasm, both were subsequently preoccupied with the Cyprus dispute (which strained their NATO ties), and both made it clear from the beginning that any contributions from them would have to be heavily subsidized. The circumstances of Turkey's later withdrawal from the Paris group were such as to strongly suggest this was a quid pro quo for Soviet support on Cyprus. Portugal and Iceland have shared Luxembourg's indifference, and Norway and Denmark, although by no means indifferent, have stood aside. Neither of the latter two has been able to decide whether to participate in the Special Committee, neither has any intention whatsoever of joining in an integrated weapons system, and the attitude of the previous government in Oslo has bordered on active hostility toward any such development.

The Imponderables

30. If, as the preceding indicates, there is not now a consensus for going ahead with either the MLF or the ANF, and if the Special Committee remains an unknown quantity to the allies and therefore of unknown acceptability as an alternative, the question of course remains whether there is any reasonable prospect that such a consensus might emerge, say, during the course of negotiations in the next six months or year. On balance, it would seem risky to assume so--not only because of the importance of issues which have never been decided and the national interest behind those differences, but also because of the difficulty of knowing how the numerous variables which are still outstanding will interact.

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a. The US Variable: Assistant Secretary Leddy has suggested that the period since last December has demonstrated that, without US leadership, the two principals, Britain and West Germany, are unlikely to reach an agreement among themselves. The evidence supports this conclusion. The lengthier period which preceded the December decision also demonstrated, however, that even with vigorous US leadership, it was not possible to tip the scales in favor of the MLF. It must be anticipated that this situation, uncomfortable though it may be, is likely to continue to prevail. The Europeans look to Washington for leadership on the nuclear question, and without it, they are unlikely to be able to decide what if anything they would wish to do. On the other hand, if the US proposes to proceed with old formulas or offers new ones which seem to do violence to basic national interests, the effect is divisive, and in the end, no agreement will be reached.

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c. The German Variable: At the present juncture we would also consider it folly to expect too much of Bonn. It is not only a question of Germany's international position preventing it from taking the lead.

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
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d. The French Variable: Despite the current disposition to assume that we can--and perhaps must-- proceed with some settlement of the nuclear issue without French concurrence if necessary, any course which did not include France's position and capabilities in its calculations would, we believe, be dubious indeed. Insofar as De Gaulle has disclosed in the past few months the more horrifying aspects of his future intentions regarding the Alliance, there are grounds for reasonable confidence that none of the present NATO governments will find them an attractive course to follow. On the other hand, it would be easy to underestimate De Gaulle's more general appeal to "European nationalism," the great reluctance with which all Europeans will approach an open break with France, and the resources he has at hand. Among the themes he will surely manipulate will be the risks of a new German hegemony, the desirability of a European settlement, and alternately, American oppressiveness and unreliability. Nor, despite the present evidence of the extremes to which De Gaulle's thinking has carried him, can we exclude the possibility of his offering a more attractive package--a European free trade area of more general membership and some kind of political-military consultative system.

e. The European Variable: This latter possibility raises what may be the key imponderable--the uncertain future of "Europe" itself. France has already visited on the Common Market the crisis it is expected

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later to create in NATO, and the outcome of the one will surely affect--and possibly even determine--the outcome of the other. (In fact, barring a settlement of the EEC crisis later this year--which seems most unlikely, the two crises will probably merge sometime next year.) Views on how the EEC issue may be settled are at this point speculative, but we do not see how any nuclear policy decision can fail to take into account the ramifications of some of the possibilities. If, for example, the Five should "cave in" to De Gaulle's demands for major, substantive revision of the EEC treaty, they will almost certainly be in a weaker position to resist his demands for an end to integration in NATO--and they may have taken the first step towards involving themselves in De Gaulle's alternative European system which would also include defense. If on the other hand the Five stand firm and De Gaulle accepts a reasonable compromise, the community commitment to the Atlantic system would also seem on firmer ground. Should, however, De Gaulle choose to take France out of the Common Market, we would then of course face a totally new situation in Europe. It would, for one thing, bring to a head the question of Britain's relationship to Europe. This might suggest some entirely different approach to the nuclear question, but it would probably also inaugurate a period of intensive negotiations in which the prevailing view might well be that the nuclear question should again be set aside.

f. The Soviet Variable: The remaining important imponderable--whether or not the Soviet Union is seriously interested in a non-proliferation agreement--is the most difficult to assess, and we do not wish in this paper to go beyond the obvious indication that it must be taken into account. On several occasions recently, Soviet officials have emphasized that the MLF is the "only" obstacle in the way of such agreement and that existing nuclear arrangements as well as the Special Committee would be compatible even with the Soviet draft. Although these overtures may signify a genuine interest in making some progress toward resolving the outstanding differences on a draft non-proliferation treaty, they may on the other hand be intended merely to encourage other NATO members to share Moscow's own apprehensions about any increase in Germany's nuclear role in the Alliance. However, whatever Moscow's present intentions, it is evident that

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should it decide at some point to make it unequivocally clear that an ANF/MLF arrangement is in fact the only roadblock to a non-proliferation agreement, there would be fewer in NATO than now who would believe collective nuclear arrangements should still come first.

### Conclusions

31. The great uncertainties which have been outlined above do not argue so much for inaction as they do for caution. The preliminary reactions to the McNamara proposals are sufficiently favorable to suggest that this is, if not a promising course, at least a non-controversial one. Depending on what the US is prepared to put into the Special Committee, it is probable that the preponderant majority of NATO members which are basically content with things as they are could find their nuclear aspirations satisfied for the foreseeable future by this line of development. France would not, of course, be among these--but less so because of its objections to the Special Committee per se than because of its views towards the continuation of the present NATO structure as a whole.


32. It is further believed that those members of the Alliance who would consider the Special Committee a desirable continuation and elaboration of the consultative approach to nuclear sharing would also accept without difficulty a further delay in the consideration of collective nuclear arrangements--in several cases, at least, they would welcome it. On balance, it would be our judgment that the past year has in effect been a "cooling off" period--none of the issues which were outstanding a year ago have moved appreciably closer to a settlement, and on balance, there is probably considerable reluctance to see them opened again. A strong US-German endorsement at this time of some kind of MLF/ANF approach would not necessarily assure eventual agreement. It is questionable as well that variants on the ANF which postpone multinational components and therefore give the Germans very little return on their money are any more negotiable.

33. To a very considerable extent, the nuclear sharing question is at this time primarily an issue between West Germany and the two European nuclear powers which, by their possession of "independent" deterrents,

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have and intend to keep a position within the Alliance not commensurate with their strength. Sooner or later this inequality will have to be redressed, but it is doubtful that collective nuclear arrangements within the Alliance are the only means of doing this, and we are skeptical that the issue is as pressing even now as some allege.



ever, this may prove a more manageable problem than before. Moreover, if in addition to pursuing the Special Committee program with vigor the US could offer Bonn some further bilateral assurance--which it could publicly use--of its nuclear guarantee, it is doubtful the coalition would now be seriously troubled by its domestic critics.

34. In the longer term, the nuclear sharing question is only an important part of the whole question of the US relationship with Europe--politically and economically as well as militarily. This paper is not the place to attempt to pursue this view in great depth, but it must be recognized, for instance, that it is and will continue to be impossible to devise any acceptable scheme for nuclear sharing which does not take into consideration the totality of our European involvement. For example, some of the chafing over American nuclear preponderance is almost certainly attributable to the distaste for other manifestations of the US hegemony--US investments, the international role of the dollar, etc. It should also be recognized that there may have been occasions when the US, while talking about Europe organizing itself so that it could pursue an effective partnership with the US, has seemed overly eager to commit Europe to that partnership--in a subordinate way. The MLF may have been such an instance. Moreover, we should recognize that, if we still wish a European partner, we must be extremely careful not to upset in our eagerness the delicate balance of power which would make it possible for such a partner to emerge. The UK-US "special relationship" has been an obstacle to European unity--a German-US "special relationship" would be a roadblock.

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35. Finally, at the risk of some repetition, we consider at the present juncture the question of timing almost as important as the question of substance. Despite the press build-up that the forthcoming visit of Erhard is the "time for decision" on the nuclear question, we consider this neither necessary nor the times propitious. The possibility of any quick and easy agreement seems so questionable and the imponderables so weighty, that--in the EEC as well as in NATO--it would appear rather a time for standing firm than for breaking new ground. In any case, along with new problems, new and important opportunities may also emerge from the resolution of the crises in both organizations.

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## INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

ATLANTIC NUCLEAR DEFENSE

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

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